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Our world is awash in preventable and undeserved misery. The World Bank Group (Cruz
et al. 2015) estimates that currently about 9.6% of the global population or 702 million
people live in extreme poverty or on less than US $1.90 per day. The extremely poor
are unable to meet their most basic needs for nutrition, medical care, and shelter. As a
result, they suffer and/or die from preventable illness and disease and malnutrition.
Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly hard hit: it is estimated that about 35% of its population
is extremely poor (Cruz et al. 2015). Unsurprisingly, this region has the highest under-five
mortality rate on the planet.
The extremely poor are not the only ones living wretched lives. Each year vast numbers
of non-human animals suffer and are killed in order to produce inexpensive, palatable
foodstuffs. Billions of broiler chickens, for instance, are kept in cramped, polluted con-
ditions, unable to engage in species-specific behavior, causing them to suffer from
disease and to experience debilitating stress. The fact that they are bred to gain weight
quickly only adds to their misery; their bone structure is often unable to support their
bulk, leading to disability and deformity. At the end of their short lives, such chickens
are deprived of food, captured, shipped in horrid conditions to slaughterhouses, and
then killed (often painfully and brutally).
The misery produced by extreme poverty and by our treatment of non-human animals
calls for some kind of practical response. Much of this suffering and premature death is,
after all, preventable, often easily so. There are, however, deep divisions over how best
to respond in practice.
One response to extreme poverty involves advocating for donations (or provisions of
labor) to philanthropic organizations dedicated to preventing premature death and/or
to preventing or alleviating suffering due to it. In the case of non-human animals, one
response is to avoid consuming them and the products derived from them, especially
those produced in factory farms, where conditions are inordinately despicable, and to
donate (or labor for) charities aiming to improve the plight of non-human animals.
This raises a number of moral questions. Should one respond in this way? How much
should one contribute to philanthropic organizations, if in fact one should do so? How
should one give? Through which conduits should one direct one’s contributions?
Peter Singer has devoted his career in part to dealing with these questions. His work
(1972, 1993) on what the global wealthy ought to do in response to extreme poverty
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has been devoted to establishing, first, that they ought to make significant sacrifices for
the purpose of combating it and, second, that our common-sense attitudes about our obli-
gations to the extremely poor do not survive philosophical scrutiny. His work (1975, 1993)
on our treatment of non-human animals has been devoted to arguing, first, that non-
human animals have moral standing, second, that we ought to refrain from (among
other things) consuming them and their products, especially those produced in factory
farms and, third, that our common-sense attitudes about the moral status of non-
human animals are deeply flawed.
His groundbreaking work on these topics continues to thrive and inspire. Both his 1972
essay ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’, in which he first addressed the question of what
the global wealthy ought to do for the global poor, and his highly influential and justly
celebrated 1975 book Animal Liberation, in which he addressed the question of our obli-
gations to non-human animals, have recently been reprinted (2015b, 2016).
The positions defended in these works are still among Singer’s central preoccupations.
In The Life You Can Save (2009), for instance, he again mounts and defends the philosophi-
cal case for the claim that the global wealthy should do a lot more for the global poor.
Singer contends with the psychological mechanisms that interfere with individuals
giving to philanthropic organizations and defends a standard of giving that is not too
demanding and appeals to a wide variety of moral outlooks. But the book is not
devoted only to philosophical argument. It is focused in addition on practical consider-
ations relating to philanthropy and philanthropic interventions. Most relevant of all is
his attempt to grapple with the claim that philanthropy (including official development
assistance) has failed to combat extreme poverty. In this context, he is keen to argue
that it can be effective in achieving this goal.
The effectiveness of philanthropy is a serious problem. Skepticism about effectiveness
often stands in the way of philanthropy. It also makes a difference to the issue of how to
respond in practice to various forms of suffering once one believes that it is obligatory to
do so. It has historically been and still is quite difficult to assess the effectiveness of one’s
donations or one’s work for a charity. Even where it is possible, it is difficult to determine
the degree of effectiveness or relative effectiveness. This is due to the fact that information
about these things is hard to come by, and very little reliable research is conducted on the
effectiveness of charity and charitable interventions. To be sure that one’s philanthropy is
worth the effort one has to possess this information.
The effectiveness of philanthropy is the central focus of Singer’s recent book The Most
Good You Can Do (2015a), which is based on the Castle Lectures given at Yale University in
2013. His aim is to defend the main elements of a philanthropic movement called effective
altruism. Its chief architects are, among others, William MacAskill and Toby Ord. (MacAs-
kill’s book Doing Good Better [2015] is the Bible of effective altruism.) Singer’s arguments
on our obligations to the global poor and to non-human animals are one of the driving
intellectual forces behind this movement. Effective altruists hold that if one believes
that one ought to work toward the alleviation and/or prevention of suffering and prema-
ture death of the sort due to extreme poverty and factory farming, one ought to maximize
surplus benefit in so doing. To determine which charity or charitable intervention to
choose, effective altruists advocate reliance on robust and reliable empirical evidence,
especially randomized controlled trial field experiments. The evidence is supposed to
tell us something about a charitable intervention’s effectiveness. To figure out which
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charities the evidence suggests are most effective, effective altruists recommend reliance
on meta-charities, including GiveWell and Animal Charity Evaluators, the function of which
is to determine, of the charities and philanthropic interventions available, which is, in light
of the most robust evidence available, the most effective. The way to contribute, then, is to
select, of the options available, the charity or charitable intervention that offers on the
basis of the evidence available the most attractive cost–benefit ratio.
The hope is to convince people that charitable interventions are capable of being effec-
tive and to respond to the fact that though people are often willing, if prompted, to donate
more to charity, they are less willing to change their behavior in terms of to whom they
give. This leaves them making less impactful contributions. Effective altruists want to
alter this behavior, and think it is a moral requirement to do so.
In The Most Good You Can Do, Singer defends effective altruism by arguing against
various worries that might be raised about the idea that we ought to do the best when
donating and by showcasing how the individuals that he dubs effective altruists live
their lives. Singer wants to demonstrate that their lives are committed to commendable
ethical principles and deeply meaningful to the individuals living them. He suggests
that effective altruists are committed not only to maximizing the value of their philan-
thropy, but additionally to maximizing value generally. He presents as exemplars lives
that are lived according to a particular moral doctrine. Effective altruists are, on Singer’s
reading, committed to the principles central to Sidgwick’s ([1907] 1981) defense of utilitar-
ianism, namely, that
the good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view… of the Uni-
verse, than the good of any other; unless, that is, there are special grounds for believing that
more good is likely to be realized in the one case than in the other
and that ‘as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally, – so far as it is attainable
by my efforts, – not merely at a particular part of it’ (382). These are the principles, Singer
contends, that undergird their life choices, and they are the principles that he thinks ought
to do so. In this regard, Singer’s position is more sectarian than the one defended in The
Life You Can Save, in which he does not appeal to a comprehensive moral doctrine to
defend his outlook. In addition, effective altruists, he argues, are motivated primarily
(though not exclusively) by reason rather than by emotion. They have the capacity to over-
come initial emotional reactions in thinking about charitable giving, among other things.
For Singer, this is desirable, since emotion (often) stands in the way of effective giving
(a theme that is also explored in The Life You Can Save).
In defending these positions, Singer (2014) relies on his more basic views in ethics. He
uses his defense of effective altruism as an occasion to think about the nature of the most
basic principles of ethics and about the nature of motivation to do what is morally
required. In this way, he shows how moral philosophical views translate into practice to
make a positive difference. All the while Singer is, in true Benthamite fashion, querying
the reliability of prevailing views surrounding philanthropy. He is especially keen to chal-
lenge the idea that there is no fact of the matter about which charitable cause is best, and
that there is no rational basis for selecting amongst the charities to support.
Effective altruism has unsurprisingly attracted the ire of critics (Clough 2015; Srinivasan
2015; for a reply, see McMahan, forthcoming). Most critics focus on effective altruism’s
approach to extreme poverty. (Few critics focus on effective altruism and our treatment
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of non-human animals; this topic perhaps cuts too close to the bone.) Some of these critics
raise the concern that in focusing on what individuals ought to do effective altruists
ignore, to their discredit, the importance of dealing with features of the world that contrib-
ute to extreme poverty, including structural inequality, war, and political oppression (Sri-
nivasan 2015). Others worry about the impact of philanthropic interventions on state
sponsored attempts to deal with extreme poverty and its effects. The worry is that, if
private charities sponsor interventions that compete with state sponsored ones (e.g. a vac-
cination campaign), such interventions can undermine the quality and effectiveness of
state inventions and the mechanisms that work to make them more accountable. In
doing so, this might exacerbate the conditions of the (especially) poorly off. Effective altru-
ists are encouraged to be more mindful of the political implications of their interventions
(Clough 2015).
Singer’s defense of effective altruism and the moral principles that he thinks ought to
guide them are no less controversial. He has already attracted some critical attention (see
e.g. Gray 2015). Some of this criticism is familiar from the literature on utilitarianism and its
alleged defects and is picked up on by the participants in this symposium, though often in
a more sympathetic and nuanced fashion. In general the focus is on the impact that such
principles have on the lives of the people who endorse them and the attractiveness of the
picture of the moral life that they depict.
That Singer’s views are contentious is obvious from the papers comprising the follow-
ing symposium on The Most Good You Can Do, though, as he rightly points out in his reply
to them, the disagreements expressed take place against a background of agreement. The
question is not whether we ought to respond to suffering due to extreme poverty and
factory farming, but how and how much.
The papers comprising this symposium were first read at the Rotman Institute of Phil-
osophy in the Department of Philosophy at The University of Western Ontario on 18 Sep-
tember 2015. The participants were Anthony Skelton, Violetta Igneski, Tracy Isaacs and
Peter Singer. We are thankful to the audience for their helpful comments.
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